Explicit Reasons for Implicit Contracts: The Legal Logic to the Japanese Main Bank System by Ramseyer, J. Mark
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and
Economics Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
1993
Explicit Reasons for Implicit Contracts: The Legal
Logic to the Japanese Main Bank System
J. Mark Ramseyer
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
J. Mark Ramseyer, "Explicit Reasons for Implicit Contracts: The Legal Logic to the Japanese Main Bank System" (Coase-Sandor
Institute for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 17, 1993).
CHICAGO
JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 17
(2D SERIES)
Explicit Reasons for Implicit Contracts:
The Legal Logic to the Japanese
Main Bank System
J. Mark Ramseyer
August 1993
THE LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
Explicit Reasons for Implicit Contracts:
The Legal Logic to the Japanese
Main Bank System
J. Mark Ramseyer
Introduction
If the Wrm is a nexus of contracts, the stylized Japanese main
bank system is a nexus of implicit contracts.1 Of the many charac-
teristics commentators often ascribe to it, take four:
1. The main bank monitors its debtors more intensively
than the amount of its loans would suggest;
2. It insures its clients against business failure;
3. It loans its clients large sums, both long- and short-
term; and
4. It makes arrangements (1) and (2) implicitly.2
These characteristics raise two quite diVerent inquiries: (1) through
(3) lead readers to ask why these phenomena occur; (4) should lead
them to ask whether (1) and (2) occur.
Implicit main bank contracts are not promises that chain-
smoking CEOs make in ornate conference rooms. Neither are they
promises made in dimly-lit Akasaka restaurants while sipping Scotch
and Xirting with hostesses. Instead, implicit contracts are promises
they never made, for had they made them, they would not be im-
plicit. Make no mistake. It may be a simple deWnitional matter, but
it is a basic one. An agreement is not “implicit” just because it may be
unwritten or incomplete. Even if oral and incompletely speciWed, it
will still be an explicit and (generally) court-enforceable contract.
Judges may prefer written and complete agreements, but they know
how to handle swearing contests over who promised what to
                                                
1Or, as Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard (1994) nicely put it, “a nexus of rela-
tionships.”
2Many discussions add a further characteristic: the main bank buys stock
in its clients. For an explanation of this phenomenon based on insider trading,
see Ramseyer (1993).
2 Chicago Working Paper in Law & Economics
whom.3 Instead, in most cases a contract is implicit if but only if no
one explicitly made it. That Japanese main bank contracts are im-
plicit thus implies that few Akasaka hostesses have ever seen a bank
oYcer agree either to monitor debtors disproportionately or to insure
them against failure. Most scholars of Japanese main
banks—whether in this volume or elsewhere—ask why banks and
debtors tacitly cut these bizarrely unspoken deals.4 In this chapter, I
ask whether they cut them at all.
In comparing the American and Japanese legal regimes, I sug-
gest three discrete hypotheses. First, Japanese Wrms borrow more
heavily from banks than American Wrms in part because of regula-
tory structures (section 1). During the late 1970s and early 1980s,
regulated interest rates more closely tracked market rates in Japan
than in the United States; during most of the post–World War II
decades, regulation made the bond market a less cost-eVective source
of funds in Japan than in the United States. For both reasons, Wrms
in Japan had less incentive to avoid the bank loan market.
Second, given the size and character of banking transactions, ra-
tional bankers and borrowers will generally negotiate their contracts
explicitly (section 2). If they do not draft contracts about issue X
explicitly, one should not conclude they draft them implicitly. One
should conclude they draft no contracts about X at all.
Third, Japanese banks may rescue borrowers when they do be-
cause the legal system keeps them from committing themselves to
jettisoning them (section 3). By punishing banks that intervene in
their borrowers’ aVairs, perhaps American judges enable banks more
credibly to commit to letting troubled Wrms die. Because Japanese
judges do not punish such banks, perhaps they do not let them
commit. Even though Japanese banks would prefer to commit to
jettisoning troubled borrowers, perhaps they cannot.
                                                
3Japanese law has no general statute of frauds requiring contracts to be in
writing, though various exceptions exist (Suekawa, 1–6). On the requirements
for insurance contracts, see Egashira (335–62); Shoho [Commercial Code], law
no. 48 of 1899, § 629.
4Notable exceptions include Miwa (1990, 1991, 1993: 178–89); Horiuchi,
Packer, and Fukuda; and Horiuchi.
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1. The Heavy Japanese Reliance on Bank Debt
1.1. DiVerential reliance
Most scholars claim Japanese Wrms rely more heavily on bank
debt than do American Wrms.5 Although they all Wnd idiosyncratic
ways of measuring the reliance and although much depends on ac-
counting deWnitions, they usually conclude the same: Japanese Wrms
borrow a bigger share of the money they need from banks than do
American Wrms. The Bank of Japan, for example, found that in 1982
American Wrms borrowed 85 cents from banks for every dollar they
borrowed on the securities markets. French Wrms showed a ratio of
2.65, British Wrms of 4.08, German Wrms of 4.20, and Japanese Wrms
of 5.33. During the three preceding years, American Wrms borrowed
1.69 times as much from banks as through securities, and Japanese
Wrms borrowed 5.33 times as much (Kitahara, 17, 115). Whether in
the United States or Japan, most small Wrms cannot issue bonds.6
Were one to examine the debt patterns only of the bigger Wrms, the
cross-national diVerences would loom larger still.
Much of this diVerence stems from two sources. First, some of it
stems from the heavy disintermediation that occurred in the United
States in the late 1970s and early 1980s; accordingly, section 1.2 out-
lines the interest-rate regulations that contributed to that phe-
nomenon. Second, some of it stems from aspects of the Japanese se-
curities market that raised the costs of securitized Wnance; section 1.3
traces the source of those costs.
1.2. Interest-rate policy
American policy. During the half-century before the mid-1980s,
American bureaucrats limited the interest banks could pay their de-
positors.7 In the late 1970s, however, they let inXation drive market
                                                
5The only exception I located was Royama, who found a largely similar
dependence on bank loans by American and Japanese Wrms until the mid-1970s.
6For example, from 1971 to 1985 Japanese Wrms with paid-in capital of under
one billion yen consistently raised less than one percent of their funds in the
bond market (Kamochi, 63).
7Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 181, codiWed as 12 U.S.C. §§ 371a, 371b
(Federal Reserve Board member banks); 12 U.S.C. § 1828(g) (FRB nonmember
banks); former Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. § 217, revoked by 51 Fed. Reg. 9767
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interest rates high. While the prime rate neared 20 percent, individ-
ual savings accounts paid 6 percent interest or less, and corporate and
checking accounts paid 0 percent. By early 1980 the diVerence be-
tween the treasury bill yield and the regulated rate on one-year time
deposits (pegged at 6 percent) reached 7.46 percent. By mid-1981, it
topped 9 percent (see table 1). The diVerence between the T-bill rate
and the pass-book savings rate (pegged at various rates from 5 per-
cent to 5.5 percent) hit 9.84 percent (Board, tab. 1.16).
EVectively, the divergence between the market and regulated
rates created a rent. To be sure, the banks may have competed some
of it away. If they did not, however, depositors and borrowers could
avoid it by circumventing the banks and transacting directly. In-
creasingly, they did. While market rates stayed low, corporate trea-
surers could cite convenience to justify keeping cash in zero-interest
demand accounts. When market rates rose, so did the opportunity
cost of keeping their cash there. Increasingly, they chose not to in-
cur that cost.
Instead, treasurers with money to park placed their money in the
commercial paper (CP) market—the market for short-term unse-
cured corporate obligations.8 Other treasurers turned to the market
to borrow. In 1959, Wrms had raised $3.7 billion in the CP market.
By 1976, they had raised $52.6 billion and by 1989, $493 billion.9
                                                                                                         
(1986); 1937 Fed. Res. Bull. 1073 (interpreting deWnition of savings account in
Reg. Q to exclude corporate accounts), reproduced in CCH Federal Banking
Law Reporter § 19, 304.16.
8Note that American banks did oVer market returns to their largest cus-
tomers. Since 1961, they had sold negotiable certiWcates of deposit (CDs). Al-
though the Federal Reserve Board had initially applied Regulation Q to the
certiWcates, by 1973 it exempted them entirely (Loring and Brundy, 349).
Hence, during the late 1970s American corporate treasurers could earn market
rates by buying these CDs. Because they could always liquidate their invest-
ment at the discounted present value of the certiWcate pay-out, the CDs gave
them both market returns and liquidity.
9Litt, Macey, Miller, and Rubin (378); Kohn (215); Stigum (48, 1024). Note
that much of what is thought to be disintermediation in the United States is
instead intermediated Wnance through the nonbank sector. Although the
amount of commercial paper outstanding (generally cited as an index of disin-
termediation) in the American market in 1987 was $353 billion, $275 billion of
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Table 1. The Interest-Rate Gap
Japan United States
Year–qu
arter
Market
Ratea
Reg’d
Rateb
MR –
RRc
Market
Rated
Reg’d
Ratee
MR –
RRc
1984–4 6.42 5.5 0.92 8.97 no
limit
0
1984–3 6.95 5.5 1.45 10.34 n.l. 0
1984–2 7.02 5.5 1.52 9.84 n.l. 0
1984–1 6.83 5.5 1.33 9.13 n.l. 0
1983–4 7.08 5.75 1.33 8.79 n.l. 0
1983–3 7.47 5.75 1.72 9.19 6.0 3.19
1983–2 7.52 5.75 1.77 8.42 6.0 2.42
1983–1 7.61 5.75 1.86 8.08 6.0 2.08
1982–4 8.02 5.75 2.27 7.93 6.0 1.93
1982–3 8.38 5.75 2.63 9.71 6.0 3.71
1982–2 8.05 5.75 2.30 12.36 6.0 6.36
1982–1 7.76 5.75 2.01 12.89 6.0 6.89
1981–4 8.31 6.25 2.06 12.02 6.0 6.02
1981–3 9.03 6.25 2.78 15.09 6.0 9.09
1981–2 8.67 6.25 2.42 14.83 6.0 8.83
1981–1 8.63 7.0 1.63 14.37 6.0 8.37
1980–4 9.31 7.0 2.31 13.71 6.0 7.71
1980–3 9.06 7.75 1.31 9.24 6.0 3.24
1980–2 9.22 7.75 1.47 10.05 6.0 4.05
1980–1 9.27 7.0 2.27 13.46 6.0 7.46
                                                                                                         
that amount was issued by such Wnancial intermediaries as Wnance companies
(e.g., GMAC). Kohn (216–18); Stigum (1027, 1060).
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Table 1. The Interest-Rate Gap
Japan United States
Year–qu
arter
Market
Ratea
Reg’d
Rateb
MR –
RRc
Market
Rated
Reg’d
Ratee
MR –
RRc
1979–4 8.60 6.0 2.60 11.80 6.0 5.80
1979–3 7.84 6.0 1.84 9.63 6.0 3.63
1979–2 7.83 5.25 2.58 9.38 6.0 3.38
1979–1 6.48 4.5 1.98 9.36 6.0 3.36
1978–4 6.08 4.5 1.58 8.68 6.0 3.68
1978–3 6.15 4.5 1.65 7.32 6.0 1.32
1978–2 6.01 4.5 1.51 6.48 6.0 0.48
1978–1 6.12 5.25 0.87 6.41 6.0 0.41
Notes and sources:
aGovernment bond yield, as given in International Monetary
Fund, International Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C.: In-
ternational Monetary Fund, various months).
bBank of Japan “guideline” interest rate applicable to one-year
time deposits, in eVect at the end of each quarter. See Nihon
ginko chosa tokei kyoku, Keizai tokei geppo [Economic Statistics
Monthly] tab. 60 (Tokyo: Nihon ginko, various months).
cDiVerence between market rate and regulated rate.
eThree-month treasury bill yield, as given in International
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (Washington,
D.C.: International Monetary Fund, various months).
fMaximum legal interest rate applicable to one-year time de-
posits, in eVect at the end of each quarter. See Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bulletin tab. 1.16
(Washington, D.C.: Federal Reserve Board, various months).
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Individual depositors abandoned banks too. Securities Wrms had
oVered mutual funds for decades. Now they oVered open-end funds
investing in the money market. There, depositors found a close
substitute for checking accounts and earned 10 to 20 percent interest
to boot. Faced with these options, depositors Xed the banks. Faced
with their Xight, regulators abandoned the restrictions on almost all
rates.10 By 1989, however, investors had already moved $338 billion to
money market funds (Stigum, 15).
Japanese policy. Although Japanese bureaucrats Wxed interest
rates, too, they more effectively limited inXation and more closely let
those rates track market rates. Granted, they banned interest on cor-
porate demand deposits. Yet they allowed near-market rates on a va-
riety of savings accounts.11 Precisely because they let those rates track
market rates so closely (see table 1), Japanese investors had less reason
to avoid banks.12 For most of the time between 1978 and 1984,
Japanese bureaucrats kept the diVerence between the market rate
and the regulated rate on one-year time deposits under 2 percent.
They never let it exceed 3 percent.13 They did let the diVerence
between the market rate and the pass-book savings rate (pegged at
various rates from 1.75 percent to 4.0 percent) hit 6.03 percent in the
third quarter of 1981. Otherwise, they kept it under 6 percent
                                                
10See generally, Depositary Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132, codiWed in 12 U.S.C. § 3501; Garn-St. Germain
Depositary Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469, codiWed
in 12 U.S.C.S. § 3503 note (mandating acceleration of deregulation). For the
revocation of Reg. Q, see 51 Fed. Reg. 9767 (1986).
11Pursuant to Okurasho kokushi [Ministry of Finance Orders] issued
under the Rinji kinri chosei ho [Temporary Financial Interest Adjustment Act],
Law No. 181 of 1947, § 2.
12Hugh Patrick suggests in correspondence that the treasury bill rate is a
short-term rate while the Japanese government bond rate is a long-term rate,
and that under most theories the long-term rate will be higher than the short-
term rates. Accordingly, he notes, this table may understate the contrast be-
tween Japan and the United States.
13In 1980, 51.8 percent of the Wnancial assets in the personal sector were in
time deposits (Suzuki 1987: 28).
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(Nihon, tab. 60). On anything other than demand accounts, they
let corporate depositors earn interest like anyone else.14
Although Japanese investors still earned positive rents by avoid-
ing regulated bank accounts, they earned lower rents than in the
United States. And because they earned lower rents, so did the en-
trepreneurs who created the institutions necessary to let them avoid
the banks. Institutions are not free. With smaller incentives to cre-
ate the institutions that would facilitate disintermediation, those
entrepreneurs did less to facilitate disintermediation in Japan than in
the United States.
1.3. The securitized loan market
Not only did Japanese investors and borrowers Wnd bank terms
more advantageous than their American peers, they also had fewer
options. American corporate borrowers could raise funds in the bond
and CP markets. American investors could obligingly park their
money there. Before the mid-1980s, however, most Japanese Wrms
had almost no cost-eVective nonbank sources for funds, and most
                                                
14Suzuki (1987: 74-83). Only demand deposits (toza yokin) paid no interest.
Overall, 47.2 percent of the deposits at the Japanese city banks were held by
corporate depositors in 1984 (Akane).
Japanese bureaucrats gave the largest depositors signiWcant market-rate op-
tions. For example, in 1979 Japanese bureaucrats let banks sell negotiable CDs.
Initially, they set a 500-million-yen minimum to the accounts. In 1984 they
lowered that amount to 300 million yen, in 1985 to 100 million, and in 1988 to
50 million. Second, in 1985 bureaucrats let banks oVer Xoating interest money-
market certiWcates. Initially, they set a 50-million-yen deposit minimum, and
let banks pay a rate that Xoated at 0.75 percent under the weekly Bank of Japan
rate for CDs. Soon, they lowered the minimum—to 30 million yen in 1986,
and 20 million and then 10 million yen in 1987. By 1989, they let banks oVer a
new small-deposit money-market certiWcate. They originally required a 3-mil-
lion-yen deposit, but then lowered that Xoor to 1 million yen, to 500,000 yen,
and by 1992 eliminated the Xoor entirely. Third, in 1985 bureaucrats let banks
pay market interest on deposits of at least 1 billion yen. Again, they have since
lowered the minimum—in steps (as with the other accounts), by 1991 to 3 mil-
lion.
In 1985, 9.8 percent of the deposited amount at the city banks paid unregu-
lated interest; by 1990, that amount was 57.9 percent (Sadaki et al., 100).
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Japanese investors had no cost-eVective nonbank places to park their
savings.
American bond markets. Large American borrowers have long
been able to obtain funds through the bond market. Although the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has regulated most
sectors of that market, it has not (except with junk bonds) killed any
sector. In several ways, it has even relaxed the regulatory framework.
Through some of these changes, it has signiWcantly cut the cost of
securitized Wnance. As but one example, take “shelf registration.”
Beginning in 1982, the SEC oVered it as an alternative to the tradi-
tional registration procedure. Borrowers must usually Wle elaborate
disclosure statements to issue long-term (over nine months) public
debt. Under the new shelf-registration regime, they can reduce the
cost of the process by Wling a blanket statement covering future is-
sues.15 Rather than register each time they needed extra cash, they
can now issue their bonds “oV the shelf.” On a typical $90-million
issue of Wfteen-year, 12-percent-coupon bonds in the early 1980s,
they saved $2.3 million.16
Japanese bond markets. Until the late 1980s, most Japanese is-
suers—even many of the safest Wrms—found the bond markets
either closed or prohibitively expensive. The reason lay in part in the
political power of the banks. In order to protect the spread they
earned on the diVerence between the rates they paid on deposits and
earned on loans,17 the banks had to control the securitized loan
                                                
15Rule 415, 17 C.F.R. § 230.415;    see   Clark (1986: 751–52).
16Present-valued aggregate savings. See Kidwell and Thompson (192);
Bhagat, Marr, and Thompson. Although Japanese regulators now permit
shelf-registration too, they have done so only since the fall of 1988. Shoken
torihiki ho [Securities Exchange Act], Law No. 25 of 1948, §§ 23-3 through 23-
12, as amended by Law No. 75 of 1988; Okura sho rei No. 41 of Sept. 20, 1988
(Yamakawa 1988a, 1988b).
17The spread was smaller than in the United States, but larger than a
market spread. The banks did not maximize the spread between the rates.
Rather, they maximized the politically maintainable spread. The much larger
American spread quickly disintegrated as Americans developed alternatives to
banks.
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market (bonds and CP).18 After all, if large Wrms could freely turn to
a securitized market, they could easily circumvent the bank-loan
cartel. Corporate treasurers and individual investors could transact
directly or through mutual funds;19 corporate borrowers could issue
bonds or CP. Together, they could split the regulatory rents banks
would otherwise sometimes earn.
The banks did not disable the bond market entirely. Instead,
they levied a toll charge on Wrms that used it. Any rational monop-
olist would have done the same. Although bank loans often do
economize on transactional and informational costs (Horiuchi and
Okazaki; Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein 1991), they do not always
do so. Sometimes, securitized loans are cheaper. When they are, a
borrowing Wrm and a monopolistic lender can both gain if the Wrm
(a) borrows its funds in the securitized market and (b) pays the mo-
nopolist an access charge. The lenders will set that access charge
approximately equal to the diVerence between (i) the (eVectively
unregulated) rates they can charge their borrowers and (ii) the
(artiWcially low) rates they pay their depositors.
Granted, no given bank would directly have lost monopoly rents
if one of its borrowers had issued bonds and used the proceeds to re-
pay its bank loan. After all, the banks loaned their funds at market
rates. Collectively, however, the banks would have lost money.
Necessarily, whenever a bank borrower moved to the securitized
market, it took with it depositors who would otherwise have in-
vested at the artiWcially low interest rates. Necessarily, every time a
Wrm issued bonds, the banks collectively lost low-interest deposits.20
The banks collected their toll charge by managing the collateral
to the bond issues. The story begins in 1933, when the major banks
(who were then also underwriters) collectively agreed to underwrite
only secured bonds (Kuroda, 112). When the Americans bifurcated
                                                
18They also, of course, had to limit access to the equity market—a subject
beyond the scope of this chapter. Note that legally CP is not a security in
Japan. On Japanese Wnancial markets generally, see Rosenbluth.
19For a sophisticated analysis of the regulation of mutual funds in Japan,
see Miwa (1993: 277–89).
20They may not have lost quite as much as it appears, since the banks
themselves bought many of the bonds.
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Japanese commercial and investment banking in the 1940s,21 the
banks expanded their group (eventually known as the Bond Com-
mittee, the kisaikai) to include the securities Wrms. The ban on un-
secured bonds, however, they retained.22
According to the law, only banks could manage collateral.23 By
requiring bond issuers to post collateral, the Bond Committee thus
could force them to pay banks a fee for using the securities markets
(Horiuchi and Sakurai, 106; Aoki and Patrick). By pricing those
collateral-management fees strategically, it then could preserve the
banks’ monopoly pricing scheme. By all odds, it did set the price
high. According to one survey (of Tokyo Stock Exchange–listed
Wrms that had recently issued bonds abroad or made large private
placements domestically), 85.7 percent of the Wrms gave Japanese
bank commissions as a reason for selling bonds abroad (Miwa 1992:
313). On a typical 10-billion-yen bond in the Euromarket, banks
earned commission fees of 3.5 million yen. In Japan they earned 53
million yen.24
In exchange for cooperating with the banking cartel, the securi-
ties Wrms shared the regulatory rents. In order to obtain their acqui-
                                                
21Shoken torihiki ho [Securities Exchange Act], Law No. 25 of 1948, § 65.
22For an introduction to the Bond Committee system, see Minaguchi; on
the lack of a legal basis (or antitrust exemption) for the Committee, see Negishi
(28–29), Takeuchi (6).
23Tanpo tsuki shasai shintaku ho [The Secured Bond Trust Act], Law No. 52
of 1905, § 6.
24Frankel and Morgan (587). The “collateral management” services may
have been largely a sham. If so, then the collateralization requirement itself
may have been largely a wealth transfer from issuers to banks. Evidence of the
sham nature of the arrangement appears in the security interests themselves.
Many of the bonds were secured by a “mortgage” on the Wrm itself under the
Kigyo tampo ho [Enterprise Security Law], Law No. 106 of 1958. Such a
“security interest” is not a security interest at all—but simply an unsecured pri-
ority claim.
Teranishi (146–47) interprets matters very diVerently. According to him,
the bond issues were part of a successful government attempt to target credit
subsidies to favored Wrms. Under this theory, the city banks bought the bonds
at supramarket prices and in exchange received submarket loans from the Bank
of Japan.
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escence, the banks priced their collateral management services
strategically: they priced them in ways that shared with the securities
Wrms (who collectively set underwriting fees) the monopoly rents
they as banks earned.25
All this occurred with Ministry of Finance (MOF) approval. A
telling example of MOF’s role occurred in mid-1991. As underwriters
to the issuing Wrms, the securities Wrms had been selling at a dis-
count the bonds they had just underwritten. They were reselling
bonds from new issues, in short, at prices below those they had paid
the issuer. EVectively, they were cheating on their own cartel.
Having quoted supracompetitive underwriting fees, they were then
discounting those fees by underwriting the bonds themselves at
above-market prices. Once it noticed the practice, the MOF—act-
ing as “cartel cop”—intervened. Using its general police powers un-
der § 54 of the Securities Exchange Act, it ordered the Wrms imme-
diately to stop their price competition (Miwa 1992: 324-27, 1993: 71-
74; Anon. 1992: 87).
In eVect, the Wrms in the Wnancial services industry (the banks
and the securities Wrms) had together cartelized the entire industry.
Whether a borrower tried to raise its money in the bank-loan mar-
ket or on the securities market, they collected a monopoly rent.
Precisely because they controlled both markets, a borrower could not
avoid the monopoly rents in one market by raising funds in the
other.
Recent changes. Only recently did Japanese Wrms begin to borrow
signiWcant funds in the domestic bond market. Although for
decades they operated a market in government bond repurchase
contracts (known as gensaki), that market was small for many years
and never gave banks much competition. In it, those Wrms that
needed short-term working capital sold their portfolio of govern-
ment bonds, together with a promise to repurchase them (at a price
                                                
25Miwa (1992: 324–27). Obviously, in any given industry (like the Wnancial
services industry) there can only be one monopoly rent. Having cartels among
both collateral management Wrms (banks) and underwriting Wrms (securities
Wrms) thus would not have increased the total monopoly rent exracted. The
contest between the banks and securities Wrms instead would have been over
the distribution of that rent.
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reXecting an implicit interest charge) within a few months
(generally one or two). Those with excess cash then earned market
returns by buying those bonds with the repurchase agreements at-
tached. Essentially, the bond constituted collateral for what was a
short-term loan. Because one could not proWtably sell government
bonds that one did not own, the market worked as a fund-raising
device only for Wrms that already owned them.26
As table 2 shows, the domestic industrial bond market stayed
small at least until the mid-1970s. By the MOF’s own calculations,
in the Wrst half of that decade the largest Wrms raised 6 percent of
their total funding through bonds, and 10.3 percent of their bor-
rowed funds through bonds.27 For the smaller Wrms, the market was
simply not an option (Kamochi, 63).
Japanese Wrms did eventually develop a large bond market, but
only because of events overseas. Primarily for reasons exogenous to
the banking industry, the Japanese government eased foreign ex-
change controls in the early 1980s. European Wrms had maintained
an active market in foreign-currency corporate bonds, and these new
foreign exchange rules now let large Japanese Wrms tap that market.
In it, they could issue unsecured bonds. EVectively, they could avoid
the banks’ toll charge and a host of regulatory requirements besides.
When the government revised the foreign exchange rules eVective
late 1980,28 Japanese Wrms increased the money they raised abroad
from 680 billion yen in 1980 to 1.1 trillion yen in 1981. When it lib-
eralized those rules further in early 1984, they increased the amount
raised abroad from 1.9 trillion yen in 1983 to 2.7 trillion yen in 1984.
By 1989, Japanese Wrms borrowed 11 trillion yen abroad.29
                                                
26The market is known as the gensaki market. See generally Tsujimura
(38–39); Litt, Macey, Miller, and Rubin (382).
27Large being deWned as Wrms with one billion yen or more in paid-in
capital (Ishikawa, 40–41; Kamochi, 53).
28Amendments by Law No. 65 of 1979 to Gaikoku kawase oyobi gaikoku
boeki kanri ho [The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Management Act],
Law No. 228 of 1949.
29Kuroda (1987: 114); Okura (1988: 56). Due to the domestic recession, bond
issues have fallen since 1989.
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Table 2. Bond issues by Japanese industrial companies
(billion ¥)
Year Domestic Overseas
1965 391
1970 723 16
1975 1,835 475
1976 1,222 368
1977 1,403 368
1978 1,590 555
1979 1,652 735
1980 1,091 683
1981 1,815 1,118
1982 1,513 1,374
1983 1,561 1,919
1984 2,335 2,795
1985 2,585 3,253
1986 4,552 4,117
1987 5,970 5,340
1988 7,744 6,892
1989 9,284 11,129
Notes: Includes convertible issues and issues with warrants
attached.
Sources: Okura sho shoken kyoku (ed.), Okura sho shoken
kyoku nempo [Annual Report of the Ministry of Finance Se-
curities Bureau] (Tokyo: Kin’yu zaisei jijo kenkyu kai, various
years); Koshasai hikiuke kyokai (ed.), Koshasai nenkan [Bond
Annual] (Tokyo: Koshasai hikiuke kyokai, various years).
Once the large Wrms could issue bonds in the Euromarket,
Japanese banks had little choice but to ease the terms they oVered
those Wrms. First, they let them issue unsecured bonds within Japan.
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Given that the large Wrms would raise their funds overseas unless
they let them avoid the toll charge, they let them avoid it (Kuroda,
136–37). Firms issued their Wrst unsecured domestic bonds in the
1970s, and by 1984 the Bond Committee had lowered its standards
to the point where sixteen Wrms qualiWed. By 1991 four hundred
companies qualiWed, and the banks cut their collateral management
fees even on issues that remained secured.30
Second, the banks acquiesced to a CP market. Because of the
gap between market and regulated interest rates, American Wrms
had been paying banks regulatory rents that they could avoid if they
could learn to borrow from investors directly. Through the CP mar-
ket, they came to do just that.31 Japanese Wrms had not turned to a
CP market because they had had none, and they had not created a
CP market because of the political power of the banks. Although
the law did not explicitly ban CP (Takeuchi, 7), it did not clearly
permit it either. With its status ambiguous, banks could threaten to
use their power within the MOF (power that stemmed from their
ties to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, the LDP; see Ramseyer
and Rosenbluth) to interpret the ambiguity into a ban.32 Given that
risk, Japanese Wrms bargained Wrst. Because of the competitive
pressure from the Euromarket, they did eventually negotiate a CP
market. Their politically charged negotiations took time, however,
and they did not obtain their CP market until late 1987.33 Once they
                                                
30See, e.g., “Zoshi hakusho” [Capital Increase White Paper] (1987: 95)
(October 1985 liberalization), (1988: 114) (July 1987 liberalization), (1991: 30, 85)
(November 1990 liberalization), and (1992: 94–95) (management fees). Under
pressure from the Japanese Fair Trade Commission, the Bond Committee has
also been forced to abandon its uniform pricing schedule. Henceforth, collat-
eral management fees are to be determined on the basis of individualized nego-
tiations between an issuer and its bank. Anon. (1992: 94–95); Negishi (30).
31Commericial paper is generally exempt from the registration require-
ments of the 1933 Securities Act by either 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (short-term
debt), § 77d(2) (privately placed debt), or § 77c(a)(2) (line-of-credit debt). On its
exemption in Japan, see Litt, Macey, Miller, and Rubin.
32For nice summaries of the politics and ambiguities involved, see Litt,
Macey, Miller, and Rubin; Schaede.
33Tsujimura (21). CP was deWned as short-term notes (two weeks to nine
months) of 100 million yen or more.
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obtained it, they used it. Within a year, the market passed the Euro-
CP market. By December 1990, it hit 15.7 trillion yen (Stigum, 108;
Nihon, tab. 67).
2. Explicit and Implicit Deals
2.1. Legally enforceable claims
Basic to any banking system is a legal regime that lets people
enforce and transfer rights to assets. The ordinary bank loan is itself
no more than one such set of (explicit) contracts. One party (the
lender) transfers to another party (the borrower) assets to which it
has a legally enforceable claim (cash). The borrower agrees to return
the cash after a stated time, together with a fee for using it
(interest). The lender makes at least the risk-adjusted return it would
earn on the cash elsewhere; the borrower pays no more than the
risk-adjusted return it will earn on the cash. Such are the usual gains
from trade.
Absent enforceable claims, many of these gains disappear. Most
lenders will not lend unless the borrower gives them the right to sue
if it does not return the cash. Many lenders will not lend unless the
borrower also agrees to repay them before it pays anyone else. Often,
such agreements lower the price a lender would otherwise charge for
the funds. Usually, they increase the supply of funds a lender will
provide. Either way, they increase social welfare.
2.2. Alternative enforcement schemes
Not that the banking industry would collapse without courts.
Lenders and borrowers can usually protect their claims in other
ways. For instance, they can hire private armies. Whether in New
York or Tokyo, they sometimes do. And whether here or there, the
problems are obvious. Private debt collection work may have made
the Corleone family thrice a box-oYce smash. It imposes large ex-
ternalities on everyone else.
Lenders and debtors sometimes also keep their word just because
they hope to repeat the transaction. Assume a Wrm earns a higher
return on some kinds of deals than on others. The Wrm will try hard
to repeat such deals. If it must keep its word to ensure repetition, it
may even keep its word. The key, however, is the assumption: that it
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expect to earn supramarket returns by repeating these deals in the
future. Absent such future rents from repetition, rational Wrms may
renege.34
2.3. Enforcement schemes in Japan
Although many diVerences in Japanese and American banking
patterns derive from differences in the legal regimes, consider Wrst
some basic commonalities. Both countries have capitalist economies
and both countries maintain sophisticated courts. In both countries,
those courts protect most rights to private property and enforce most
consensual bargains.
That Japanese courts do all this suggests Japanese Wrms may not
use implicit agreements as often as usually argued. If courts will in-
deed enforce explicit contracts, rational parties will seldom leave large
deals to implicit terms. By deWnition, implicit contracts are not con-
tracts. Not being contracts, courts will not enforce them. Not being
enforceable, rational parties will keep them only if they expect to
earn supracompetitive rents by continuing the relationship into the
future. Parties will comply with implicit contractual terms, in other
words, only if the future repeated transactions earn them an ex-
pected return larger than the return they can expect to earn else-
where.
In deciding whether to negotiate the terms of a deal explicitly,
rational parties thus face a tradeoV. They will use implicit rather
than explicit contracts if but only if (a) the future rents (present-val-
ued, of course) necessary to induce compliance voluntarily (the
minimum compliance-inducing rents)35 are less than (b) the costs of
                                                
34Klein and LeZer; Ramseyer (1991); Shapiro; Telser. Some observers may
suggest that hostage mechanisms (Williamson) could support self-enforcement
in Japan. Although possible in theory, the point is unlikely to apply to
Japanese bank-borrower relations in practice. The most likely hostage would be
the cross-shareholdings, but because stock does not have relationship-speciWc
value, it does not work as a hostage. See Ramseyer (1993).
35Readers will note that some rents will accrue simply from the mutual
investments in relationship-speciWc information. Unless these exceed the one-
shot gains from reneging, however, these rents will not suYce to make the
deal self-enforcing. Moreover, readers should note that the same rents accrue to
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drafting the contract explicitly and enforcing it in court (the
contracting costs).36 Whenever the compliance-inducing rents ex-
ceed the contracting costs, they will draft contracts.37
In the banking industry, this tradeoV overwhelmingly militates
against implicit contracts. The reason: the minimum compliance-
inducing rents vary with the size of the transaction, while contract-
ing costs are largely independent of it. In the Wnancial services in-
dustry, a Wrm that reneges on a deal will generally pocket the cash
advanced it. Accordingly, for it not to renege it must anticipate rents
with a discounted present value greater than the cash advanced. The
bigger the deal, the bigger will be the minimum compliance-induc-
ing rents.
By contrast, legal fees are largely independent of the size of the
deal. There are obvious exceptions—e.g., the larger the deal, the
greater the incentive to Wnd higher-priced lawyers. Yet the costs of
negotiating and drafting a contract depend primarily on attorney
hours, which in turn depend on the complexities and idiosyncrasies
of the deal. They depend only tangentially on the money at stake.
Typically, therefore, once the size of a deal reaches a certain thresh-
old, the compliance-inducing rent will exceed contracting costs. At
that point, rational Wrms will negotiate all contracts explicitly.
Recall the contexts where scholars Wrst developed the theories of
implicit self-enforcing contracts. First, many scholars found the
theories helpful in understanding labor markets. Where factory
                                                                                                         
the parties even if they draft explicit contracts—the parties do not abandon the
relationship-speciWc rents by drafting court-enforceable agreements.
36Readers who complain that court enforcement is expensive largely miss
the fact that most rational parties settle outside of court by reference to the ex-
pected legal outcome (Ramseyer and Nakazato). Because the vast majority of
contract disputes in both the United States and Japan are settled outside of
court, the relevant enforcement costs for explicit contracts are not (the rela-
tively high) litigation costs, but rather (the much lower) settlement costs. Note,
however, that the higher the costs of litigation, (a) the more likely the parties
are to settle, and (b) the greater the variance in settlements.
37Note that the calculus does not change if rephrased in terms of the effect
that reneging has on the bank’s reputational capital and ability to deal im-
plicitly with other borrowers. Whether the bank earns a return of z on one
contract or a return of nz on n contracts, the calculus is the same.
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workers could easily shirk and managers could not cheaply monitor,
employers could save resources by paying workers a supramarket
wage (i.e., eYciency wages) (Shapiro and Stiglitz). Second, scholars
found that the theories helped explain how markets worked where
buyers could not cheaply conWrm product quality ex ante. Where
buyers could not check quality before buying, they saved money by
paying a higher price to an established seller. Rather than risk a fake
from a peddler outside Ueno station, they bought their Rolexes from
Ginza jewelers (Klein and LeZer). Last, scholars used the models
where courts could not reach the parties involved. Unable to use
courts, medieval international traders relied on reputations and
trading clubs (Greif; Milgrom, North, and Weingast)
None of these situations remotely resembles the Japanese bank-
ing industry. First and most obviously, courts exist and work. The
parties involved are not peripatetic medieval merchants, wandering
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Second, the stakes are high. Ex-
plicit contracts may not eYciently prevent factory workers from
shirking or street vendors from peddling fake watches. But these are
not factory workers earning thirty dollars an hour or street vendors
selling three thousand-dollar watches. These are Wrms with legally
trained staVs, law-Wrms within easy reach, and millions of dollars at
stake. Modern scholars use implicit contracts to explain why these
Wrms behave as they do on million-dollar deals. They need Wrst to
explain why the Wrms reject straightforward court-enforceable con-
tracts.
In response to this, some fans of implicit contract theory may
cite problems of veriWcation: parties will prefer implicit contracts,
they will argue, where the deal depends on information courts can-
not verify. Although hard to verify promises exist (e.g., to cherish
and obey, till death do us part), the putative main bank contracts
(e.g., to insure against business failure) are not among them. Cre-
ative lawyers can easily suggest a wide variety of veriWable indices of
business trouble, and can easily list just as many veriWable bank re-
sponses. They regularly (and explicitly) draft contracts that insure
fashion models’ legs, football players’ arms, and singers’ voices.
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Writing an insurance contract against business failure they will Wnd
boringly mundane.38
If insurance agreements seem unlikely candidates for implicit
contracts, consider whether disproportionate monitoring agree-
ments are any more likely.39 In Japan, implicit contract theorists
argue, the main bank implicitly agrees with other banks both (a) to
monitor the debtor disproportionately and (b) to bear losses dispro-
portionately. The Mitsubishi Bank, for example, may explicitly agree
to lend Iroha Sushi, K.K., 30 percent of the bank loans Iroha needs.
At the time it does so, it may also implicitly agree to bear 80 percent
of the costs of monitoring Iroha and to absorb 80 percent of any
losses should Iroha fail.
It is hard to imagine a less likely implicit contract than this
Mitsubishi-Iroha arrangement, for it is hard to imagine a more
needlessly complicated agreement. If Iroha’s creditors collectively
Wnd it eYcient for Mitsubishi to bear 80 percent of the monitoring
costs, the straightforward way to reach that result is to have Mit-
subishi lend 80 percent of the money.40 It will then have a greater
incentive to monitor (even if not precisely 80 percent) and will ab-
sorb exactly 80 percent of any resulting losses (provided all loans have
equal priority). Because the total loans outstanding will not change,
this explicit alternative will not raise any bank’s capital requirements.
And because Mitsubishi bears 80 percent of Iroha’s default risk un-
der either scheme, neither does it reduce Mitsubishi’s diversiWca-
tion.41
                                                
38Note that if veriWcation by a court is problematic, reliance on the bank’s
reputational capital will not solve the problem either, since veriWcation by the
bank’s other partners will be equally problematic. If third parties cannot verify a
bank’s performance, then the value of the bank’s reputational capital will not
accurately reXect the bank’s performance.
39See, e.g., Sheard (1991) for a particularly insightful discussion of the
model.
40Sheard (1991) raises—and rejects—this possibility.
41Sheard (1991: 25) argues, however, that the borrower may prefer to deal
with several banks.
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3. Insurance Contracts
3.1. Initial doubts
According to the traditional stylized facts, Japanese main banks
more often rescue ailing borrowers than American banks do. When
times are bad, the main bank cuts the interest rate it charges. When
Wrms start to fail, it decides whether they have any future prospects.
If they do, it loans them extra money and gives them extra expertise.
Through such moves, it insures its borrowers against business fail-
ure.42 Many observers consider all this an implicit insurance con-
tract.43 Over the past decade, they have published several brilliant
studies exploring the phenomenon. Within this volume, they in-
clude several more. Nonetheless, it is clear neither that Japanese
Wrms would want this insurance, nor that they buy it. Consider each
point in turn.
Would Wrms want it? If a bank oVered insurance against Wrm
failure, it would invite classic problems of adverse selection. Unless
the bank had perfect information, the least credit-worthy Wrms
would disproportionately apply for the insurance. Because the bank
cannot distinguish risk levels perfectly, the higher risk level in the
pool would cause the bank to raise the insurance premium it
charged. The safest Wrms in the pool would then decline the insur-
ance contract, and the average risk level would rise further. The
bank would raise the premium still higher, still more Wrms would
decline the contract, and so forth. The process would continue re-
                                                
42Some observers describe the implicit insurance contract as something
close to a mixed strategy: the main bank agrees to rescue the Wrm with proba-
bility x, where x is positive but less than 1. Despite some suggestions to the
contrary, it is not clear why this would eliminate either moral hazard or ad-
verse selection, so long as the main bank has less than perfect information
about the debtor’s strategy.
43This is a fundamentally diVerent theory from Hoshi, Kashyap, and
Sharfstein’s (1991) argument that the main bank lowers the cost of Wnancial
distress. They do not argue that the main bank necessarily oVers an implicit
insurance contract. Rather, they argue that its presence reduces the transactions
costs of reorganizing distressed Wrms.
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lentlessly—until the market for the insurance disappeared
(Akerlof).44
The bank would face equally severe problems of moral hazard.
Just as Barbara Stanwyck (sort of) played a nice kid before buying
her husband accident insurance with a double indemnity clause, ra-
tional Wrms would pretend to invest in low-risk projects in order to
buy their implicit insurance against failure more cheaply. Just as
Stanwyck then (sort of) tossed her husband oV the train, rational
Wrms would then hike the risk level of the projects they undertook.
Some implicit insurance theorists argue that main banks can
prevent this moral hazard by punishing the incumbent managers in
the Wrms they rescue. Unfortunately, the gain to the Wrm’s share-
holders from the moral hazard will often exceed the loss to the few
Wred managers.45 As a result, rational shareholders can compensate
their managers ex ante for any punishment the managers will incur
if the bank later intervenes and punishes them. To do so, they need
simply to pay the managers a supramarket salary. So long as they pay
them wages that include a premium equal to the risk-adjusted loss
the managers suVer if the Wrm fails and the main bank intervenes,
both the shareholders and the managers gain.
Do banks sell it? Whatever the logic to implicit contracts, to date
no one has shown that banks actually oVer them. Indeed, no one
has shown that Japanese banks more regularly rescue debtors than
American banks. Consider several bits of evidence. First, large num-
bers of Japanese Wrms fail regularly. From 1981 to 1985, a mean of
18,700 Wrms with debt of over 10 million yen went out of business
every year (Chusho). Granted, most of the failing Wrms were small.
Yet that fact itself suggests the Wrst caveat: banks do not insure small
Wrms. In turn, the caveat suggests the Wrst problem: why not insure
small Wrms? Banks should Wnd it no harder to monitor small Wrms
than large. Small Wrms should want the insurance as badly as large.
If (as seems likely) small Wrms generally run less diversiWed opera-
                                                
44These problems of adverse selection and moral hazard would disappear if
main banks had perfect information. For arguments that main banks have good
information, see Hoshi, Kashyap, and Sharfstein (1990: 69); Sheard (1989).
45Note that the main bank will own no more than 5 percent of the Wrm’s
stock. See Ramseyer (1993).
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tions than large, they may even want the insurance more. If banks
and large Wrms can negotiate mutually advantageous implicit insur-
ance, so should banks and small Wrms.46 And if banks and small
Wrms do not Wnd implicit insurance mutually advantageous, perhaps
something else better explains the apparent bank rescues of large
Wrms.
Second, several scholars who have tried to locate empirical evi-
dence of the insurance have not found it. Horiuchi, Packer, and
Fukuda, for example, used data from the chemical industry to ask
whether main banks lowered interest charges to troubled Wrms.
They found no evidence that they did. Miwa (1990: chap. 6) asked
whether main banks increased their percentage of a Wrm’s loans
when the Wrm fell into distress. He too found no evidence.
Last, no one has ever found any evidence that Wrms pay for this
insurance (Miwa 1991: 16)—and absent that payment one would not
expect banks to oVer the insurance. Some scholars suggest that those
Wrms which want the insurance pay a higher interest rate on loans
from their main bank than on loans from other banks. No one has
found any evidence that this occurs. Others suggest, more promis-
ingly, that those Wrms which want the insurance route their main
bank a greater share of their fee-based business. Since all Wrms need
the fee-based services, however, this eVectively suggests that all Wrms
might receive the insurance. To be sure, some Wrms use more such
services than others. Given a single industry, large Wrms will typically
buy more foreign exchange than small; given a single Wrm size,
export-oriented Wrms will buy more foreign exchange than others.
Nonetheless, the Wrm’s need for these fee-based services will seldom
correlate with its riskiness. If so, the bank cannot be pricing its in-
surance very eYciently. And if banks are not pricing it carefully, the
best conclusion about the implicit insurance contracts may be that
banks do not sell them.
                                                
46Note (a) that the per-asset-value premium on the insurance could be
higher for small Wrms if they systematically have inferior management, (b) that
the premium could also be higher for small Wrms if there are economies of scale
to monitoring, and (c) that the insurance might be unavailable entirely if
owner-managers presented more serious moral-hazard problems.
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3.2. Equitable subordination and bank rescues
Consider, however, another possibility: perhaps Japanese banks
do rehabilitate large borrowers more than American banks, but do so
because they cannot credibly threaten to let them fail. Given that
Japanese courts will let a bank rescue a borrower without jeopardiz-
ing its rights in bankruptcy, perhaps Japanese banks Wnd some res-
cues proWtable ex post. By contrast, perhaps American banks aban-
don borrowers because they cannot cheaply save them. Given that
American courts sometimes punish a bank for intervening in its
debtors’ aVairs, perhaps American banks Wnd rescues more often
unproWtable even ex post.
The ex post incentive. All else equal, creditors sometimes (not al-
ways) have an incentive ex post to intervene and rescue debtors who
threaten default.47 Many Wrms Wnd themselves in trouble at least
partly because they lack adequate cash—they Wnd themselves illiquid
even when not insolvent. A bank that has lent such a Wrm large
amounts will sometimes Wnd that lending it extra funds, even short-
term, pays. If it refuses to lend those funds, the Wrm will fail. If it
has secured its past loans, it may then receive a share of the liquida-
tion proceeds—but its share will likely fall short of its outstanding
claim. If it lent its money unsecured, it will receive even less. Simply
by advancing such a Wrm cash, the bank can sometimes recover its
principal and interest in full. As a result, all else equal, American and
Japanese banks will sometimes be tempted ex post to save their fail-
ing debtors.
The ex ante logic. If a bank would Wnd it proWtable to rescue a
troubled Wrm ex post, it faces serious problems ex ante. Most basi-
cally, it will Wnd it hard credibly to threaten to punish a borrower
that defaults. As the punishment will be unproWtable ex post, the
threat to punish will be incredible ex ante. Unable to threaten ex
ante, the bank can now sell only bundled credit-insurance contracts.
In turn, to the extent it cannot constrain its debtors, those debtors
will exploit the bundled contract by increasing the risk level of their
                                                
47See Bulow and Shoven. Explicit contracts are unlikely to help much
here. Even if the bank explicitly stated ex ante that it would not help a debtor
in distress, it might still have an incentive to break that statement and defer re-
payment. Obviously, the borrower will not complain if the bank does so.
Explicit Reasons for Implicit Contracts 25
projects. The bank will anticipate this, of course, and raise the price
it charges. The inability to commit ex ante, in other words, will cre-
ate incentives ex post that in turn will generate adverse selection and
moral hazard ex ante. Disintermediation will ensue: Wrms that would
prefer to undertake lower risk projects will leave the bank-loan mar-
ket entirely.
With small borrowers, a bank may yet be able to make its threat
credible by combining precommitment strategies with a concern for
its reputation. BCCI notwithstanding, for most banks the credit
business is an iterated game. Precisely because of the moral-hazard
and adverse-selection problems that bundled credit-insurance con-
tracts aggravate, a bank may hope to cultivate a ruthless reputation
for not insuring its borrowers. If it lends money often enough and
discounts the future at a rate low enough, with small borrowers such
a reputation-based strategy may work (Kreps et al.; Rasmusen, §
5.4).
With large debtors, a bank will Wnd it harder to make such repu-
tational strategies work. Even banks that can jettison small bor-
rowers Wnd it hard to bully Wrms to whom they have lent enormous
amounts. College professors with southern California mortgages
may Wnd their Wnances dominated by their local savings and loan.
But insolvent third-world strongmen with multibillion dollar loans
seem sometimes to dictate terms to the great money-center banks.
Models of repeated games and precommitment may explain why
banks adopt strategies that otherwise do not seem credible—but they
work only if the bank’s one-shot loss from punishing a Wrm is small
compared to its future reputational rents. When a Wrm’s debt is large
enough, the bank’s ex post unproWtable strategy will make the bank’s
ex ante threat less credible. When a large enough debtor threatens to
fail, even a ruthless bank may try to rescue it.
The Amreican law of Wrm rescues. EVectively, Japanese banks may
be selling implicit insurance contracts to the largest Wrms that the
Wrms do not want. When a large Wrm borrows from a Japanese
bank, perhaps it knows that—should it Wnd itself in trouble—the
bank may save it. Even if the Wrm does not want the insurance, the
bank cannot credibly sell it unbundled credit. Unable credibly to
threaten to let failing large debtors fail, the bank has no choice but
to include insurance with its credit.
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Even if American banks less often rescue their borrowers than
Japanese banks do (a proposition no one has proven), that fact
would not necessarily show that willing Japanese banks sell implicit
insurance to willing Japanese borrowers. American banks instead
may be jettisoning their clients because their bankruptcy law more
readily lets them commit to doing so. The hypothesis follows.
By tradition, American judges have looked skeptically at creditors
who intervene in a debtor’s business. Those who do so, they reason,
may try to restructure the debtor to their private advantage. Should a
bank intervene, therefore, American judges sometimes subordinate
its claims.48
At stake is the doctrine of “equitable subordination”: for the sake
of “fairness” a judge may subordinate the claims of a creditor that
intervenes before Chapter 11 in its debtor’s aVairs.49 “[A]s a court of
equity,” Chaitman (1561) explained, a bankruptcy court “has the
power to subordinate the claims of one creditor to those of other
creditors where the claimant has engaged in some type of in-
equitable conduct which has resulted in an unfair advantage to the
claimant or an injury to the other creditors.” Hence, a bank can lose
its priority whenever “the bank has taken control of the debtor, thus
assuming the Wduciary duties of a controlling shareholder, and then
breached those duties to the injury of general creditors.”50
                                                
48Interventionist creditors have also been required to pay various debtor
liabilities out of their own pockets (Douglas-Hamilton). Absent collective ac-
tion problems among creditors (but only absent such problems), creditors could
vitiate the eVect of the equitable subordination doctrine by unanimously agree-
ing not to argue the theory in court.
491 U.S.C. § 510(c). See generally Chaitman; Clark (1977, 1981); DeNatale
and Abram; Herzog and Zweidel; Anon.; Collier (vol. 3: § 510.05). For what
is probably the Wrst discussion of the possible role of the doctrine in U.S.-
Japan comparisons, see Prowse (50).
50Chaitman (1562). For examples of cases subordinating creditor claims
under the doctrine of equitable subordination, see, e.g., In re Osborne, 42 B.R.
988 (D.C. W.D. Wisc. 1984) (credit association’s claims subordinated to trade
creditors’ where association induced trade creditors to continue to make deliver-
ies while debtor was in Wnancial trouble, even absent control by association
over debtor); In re Sepco, Ind., 30 C.B.C.2d 474, 36 B.R. 279 (B.C. D.S.D.
1984) (bank claims subordinated upon Wnding of fraud by bank agent in nego-
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At trial, banks argue that the doctrine prevents them from sav-
ing troubled clients. Nonetheless, many judges remain skeptical:
While defendant [i.e., the bank] argues that subordination
will cause members of the Wnancial community to feel they
cannot give Wnancial assistance to failing companies, but
must instead foreclose on their security interests and collect
debts swiftly, not leaving any chance for survival, the Court
is singularly unimpressed.51
The bank in the case had restructured a troubled debtor and ad-
vanced it extra funds. When the debtor started to fail anyway, it
tried to ensure that the debtor repaid its debts to the bank. The un-
secured creditors complained, and the court took their side. Once in
control of the debtor, the bank could not use its control to its private
advantage. Having tried, it now stood last in line.
American bankers have not missed this risk of subordination.
The problem “has generated much debate and fear among members
of the Wnancial community,” DeNatale and Abram (417) noted.
Granted, courts do not necessarily subordinate creditors who inter-
vene. They do so only when they think creditors intervened and
misbehaved. According to the usual judicial formula, they subordi-
nate a creditor’s claim only when: the creditor “engaged in some type
of inequitable conduct,” the creditor obtained “an unfair advantage”
over other creditors, and equitable subordination is not “inconsistent
with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.”52 Unfortunately, the
formula does not much help. Judges subordinate claims whenever
                                                                                                         
tiating with other creditor), aV ’d, 750 F.2d 51 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Sayman’s
Inc., 15 B.R. 229 (B.C. N.D. Ga. 1981) (creditor’s claims subordinated where
creditor cut oV service in overly hasty manner); In re American Lumber C., 7
B.R. 19 (B.C. D. Minn. 1979) (where bank controlled actions of debtor and
liquidated debtor in manner advantageous to itself but not to unsecured credi-
tors, bank’s claims were subordinated), aV’d, 5 B.R. 470 (D.C. D. Minn. 1980);
In re Process-Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (lender’s se-
cured claim subordinated upon Wnding of control, domination, and fraud),
rev’d on other grounds, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. den’d, 386 U.S. 957
(1967).
51In re American Lumber Co., 5 B.R. at 478.
52In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5th Cir. 1977).
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“equity” demands it and equity, like pornography, lies in the eye of
the beholder. Ultimately, American creditors restructure their
debtors at their peril.53
Equitable subordination does not make bank rescues impossible;
it makes them more costly. When a Wrm hits bad times, creditors
will seldom lend more money without controlling the way the Wrm
uses it. Under American law, they can do so before a Chapter 11 Wl-
ing only by gambling all: if the Wrm succeeds, the bank recovers its
claim; if the Wrm fails and the other creditors convince the judge
that the bank indulged its private biases, it potentially loses all. For
the sake of making credible threats, perhaps that risk often suYces.
Precisely because of this ex post risk to intervention, perhaps Ameri-
can banks can more credibly threaten to jettison defaulting debtors
ex ante.54
The Japanese law of Wrm rescues. Japanese judges use no doctrine
analogous to equitable subordination. Granted, the proposition is
impossible to prove, risky even to advance. Few things in compara-
tive legal work are harder than proving a categorical negative, and
doubly so when the issue involves a matter so entrusted to judicial
whimsy. Whether in the United States or Japan, in bankruptcy cases
judges wield enormous discretion. They can disallow sales, pay-
ments, and security interests, for example, sometimes even when the
parties complete the transaction before anyone Wles for bankruptcy.55
Moreover, even though they may phrase it diVerently, Japanese
judges do exercise their discretion in ways that often resemble the
American judicial concern for “equity.” If a bankrupt Wrm repays a
debt to beneWt one speciWc creditor, the judge may void the pay-
                                                
53I attempt no statistical analysis of judicial behavior because reported cases
never constitute a representative sample of disputes. On the impossibility of
using court verdict rates to prove the direction of the law, see Priest and Klein.
54Often, of course, there will be public debt subordinate to the bank’s loan.
Because the indenture trustee cannot legally waive the default, rescues often can
be made only by the bank.
55Hasan ho [Bankruptcy Act], Law No. 71 of 1923, § 72 (grounds for dis-
allowing creditor claims); Kaisha kosei ho [Corporate Reorganization Act], Law
No. 172 of 1952, § 78 (same). See generally Matsushita.
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ment.56 If it repays a debt knowing that it thereby harms other
creditors and the payee knows that too, the judge may void the pay-
ment.57 If it sells real estate (even at fair market value) and might
squander the cash, the judge may void the sale.58 And if a debtor
grants a security interest after it has started to default on its notes, a
judge may void the security interest.59 What one does not see in these
cases, however, is any equivalent of equitable subordination—any
series of decisions where judges voided security interests to punish a
major secured creditor who intervened in the debtor’s aVairs.
Without such a doctrine, a creditor will more often Wnd such inter-
vention proWtable ex post. ProWtable ex post, its threats will be less
credible ex ante.
The absent evidence. The question, then, is whether the absence
of an equitable subordination doctrine in Japan increases the inci-
dence of Wrm rescues. To answer it, we need several pieces of evi-
dence we do not yet have. First and most basically, if the proposition
is true, then (all else equal) Japanese banks should more readily rescue
troubled Wrms than American banks. We do not know this. We
know only that both Japanese and American banks rescue a few
large troubled Wrms and jettison most others.
Second, large Japanese debtors should be at a greater disadvan-
tage in the loan market than large American debtors. According to
the hypothesis, (a) the absence of equitable subordination prevents
Japanese banks from commiting to jettisoning borrowers with large
debts to the bank, (b) the presence of the doctrine allows American
banks to make that commitment, and (c) reputational considerations
                                                
56Ito v. Hayasaka, 25 Saihan minshu 779, 781-82 (S. Ct. July 16, 1971); Usui
v. Nomura, 12 Daishin’in minshu 3043 (S. Ct. Dec. 28, 1933).
57Yumoto v. Makara, 21 Saihan minshu 859 (S. Ct. May 2, 1967).
58Ito v. Uno, 746 Hanrei jiho 38 (S. Ct. June 27, 1974); Nakayama v.
Nonaka, 12 Daishin’in minshu 637, 663 (S. Ct. Apr. 15, 1933).
59K.K. Yamagata ginko v. Nomura, 29 Kakyu minshu 516 (Sendai H. Ct.
Aug. 8, 1978). According to Shimojima (335), recorded security interests cannot
be voided in bankruptcy proceedings, but unrecorded interests can. See Ito v .
Hayasaka, 25 Saihan minshu 779 (S. Ct. July 16, 1971). Even recorded security
interests can be voided in reorganization proceedings. See Akagi v. K. K.
Menzu roman, 861 Hanrei jiho 108 (Kobe D.C. Feb. 28, 1977).
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enable both Japanese and American banks to commit to jettisoning
borrowers with small debts. If so, then large American debtors
should do better in the credit market relative to small American
debtors than large Japanese debtors do relative to small Japanese
debtors. On this too we have no evidence.
Third, Japanese debtors should try to keep their debts at any one
bank small. If the hypothesis is true, then Japanese debtors will try
harder than American Wrms do to avoid borrowing large amounts
from any one bank. We do know that Japanese Wrms diversify their
borrowings (Ramseyer 1991). Unfortunately, we do not know
whether, all else equal, they do so more than American Wrms.
Last, the absence of equitable subordination in Japan should
promote disintermediation. If the absence of equitable subordination
prevents Japanese banks from credibly committing to jettisoning
troubled clients, it necessarily forces them to bundle “implicit insur-
ance contracts” with the credit they sell. Because moral hazard and
adverse selection will raise the price banks must charge for these
bundled credit-insurance contracts, low-risk Wrms will try to avoid
the bundled package. The best way to do that is to leave the bank-
loan market entirely.60
Japanese Wrms have started to leave the bank-loan market. From
1985 to 1989, Wrms increased the amounts they raised through bond
issues nearly fourfold (table 2). According to Hoshi, Kashyap, and
Scharfstein (1991), from 1983 to 1990, Wrms listed on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange reduced their ratio of bank debt to total debt by a
third. Those able to issue bonds not guaranteed by a bank reduced it
by over 40 percent. The safest Wrms, it seems, deserted the banks en
masse. As Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) put it, Wrms with
“good performance, valuable investment opportunities, or valuable
assets” turned to the bond market. Only those with signiWcant
“scope for ineYcient behavior” remained.
Ultimately, equitable subordination remains a tenuous hypothe-
sis. Most obviously, the only evidence we have on point is that of
disintermediation—and that, of course, is a phenomenon subject to
                                                
60On some of the reasons multiple bond holders cannot as cheaply rene-
gotiate the terms of their debt contract as a single bank can, see Roe.
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an enormous variety of explanations. Yet we also do not know the
aggregate eVect of bankruptcy law, for equitable subordination is but
a small part of the picture. Although all American courts in theory
apply the doctrine, more is at stake. Some American courts treat the
doctrine skeptically.61 Some American courts punish banks for not
rescuing a Wrm (on the ground that the bank refused the additional
credit in “bad faith”). And most American courts let a bank safely
“rescue” Wrms so long as it waits until after they Wle Chapter 11 peti-
tions. In the end, a basic empirical vacuum remains: although
Japanese banks help some troubled borrowers, they jettison most;
although American banks jettison most troubled borrowers, they
help some. Beyond that, we cannot say.
4. Conclusion
As part of the institutional structure of an economy, legal rules
shape the deals Wrms cut. By altering the costs of alternative forms of
economic exchange, they alter the transactions Wrms enter. The
diVerences between American and Japanese commercial practice
form a case in point: some of the most puzzling diVerences may
largely be artifacts of the diVerent legal regimes in place.
The Japanese main bank system (to the extent a distinctive sys-
tem exists) may be one such idiosyncratic result. Recent observers use
the system to explain the large bank debts Japanese Wrms use and to
posit aesthetically appealing models of implicit contractual arrange-
ments: agreements where one bank agrees with the other banks to
act as their delegated monitor, and agrees with the Wrm to insure it
against business failure. It is not that these models are theoretically
impossible. At stake are indeWnitely repeated transactions, and we
know from the game-theoretic folk theorem that in such worlds
anything can be an equilibrium. It is rather that they are realistically
implausible.
Any diVerences between the Japanese and American banking
systems may derive from far more mundane reasons. Consider why
Japanese Wrms borrow so much of their money from banks. First,
during the late 1970s and early 1980s, Japanese bureaucrats caused
                                                
61Kham &  Nates’ Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d
1351 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.).
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regulated rates to track market rates more closely than in the United
States. As a result, investors and Wrms faced smaller incentives to
devise ways of avoiding the banks. Second, for most of the postwar
period Japanese banks levied a large toll charge (in the form of col-
lateral management fees) on anyone who used the bond market.
Firms thus could avoid the banks through the bond market only if
they repaid much of their savings to their bank.
If Japanese banks rescue large failing clients more often than
American banks rescue them (an unproven proposition), consider
why they might do so. Japanese banks may rescue their clients be-
cause they cannot credibly threaten to abandon them; American
banks may abandon their clients because they cannot cheaply save
them. American law sometimes punishes creditors who intervene in
a debtor’s business; perhaps Japanese law does not. Hence, perhaps
American banks can more credibly threaten to let troubled Wrms fail.
In doing so, they avoid the moral-hazard and adverse-selection
problems they might otherwise face. Because Japanese law does not
penalize banks that intervene, perhaps Japanese banks often cannot
credibly threaten to punish defaulting clients. Unable to threaten ex
ante, perhaps they involuntarily sell their clients bundled credit-in-
surance packages. Unfortunately, we do not yet have the data to test
the hypothesis.
For all their analytic elegance and mathematical sophistication
(and they are both elegant and sophisticated), the recent models of
implicit contracts raise a more basic problem: if banks and Wrms
want these arrangements so badly, why do they not negotiate them
explicitly and draft court-enforceable agreements? If they did draft
an agreement insuring a Wrm against speciWed business problems,
the Wrm could rely on the courts. Although complicated contracts
seldom come cheap, for transactions this large they should come
cheaper than the rents a Wrm would need to pay a bank to make an
agreement self-enforcing. Notwithstanding those potential savings,
the Wrms do not draft such agreements. Perhaps the reason is sim-
ple. Perhaps they do not make them at all.
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